关键词: 保障性住房, 物业管理, 双层委托代理, 政策执行

Abstract: Starting from the perspective of community governance structure, this paper analyzes the current issue of difficulty in collecting property management fees in affordable housing communities, proposes new viewpoints, and enriches paradigms in this field. Based on principal-agent theory, it compares the differences in property management structures between affordable housing and commercial housing communities, and proposes optimal incentive mechanisms under the two management models. The research findings show that the management of affordable housing involves a dual-layer principal-agent structure: the government acts both as an agent responsible for ensuring public welfare and as a principal that hires property management companies, requiring a balance of interests among all three parties. This “sandwich-style” principal-agent structure distorts residents’ incentives toward property management companies, leading to a lack of willingness among residents to proactively pay property fees. To balance its own interests, the benefits of residents, and the profits of property management companies, the government adopts fee reductions and subsidies in managing affordable housing property services as a strategy to achieve a three-way equilibrium.

Key words: affordable housing, property management, dual-layer principle-agent structure, policy implementation