风险投资三方委托代理关系——基于创业企业家过度自信与风投公司监督努力

doi:F 830.91

系统管理学报 ›› 2015, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (2): 190-199.DOI: F 830.91

风险投资三方委托代理关系——基于创业企业家过度自信与风投公司监督努力

查博a，郭菊娥b，晏文隽a

西安交通大学 a.管理学院；b.过程控制与效率工程教育部重点实验室，西安　710049

收稿日期:2013-10-25 修回日期:2014-01-06
作者简介:查博（1984-），男，博士生。研究方向为投融资决策与风险管理。E-mail：zhabo127127@163.com
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71173169）

Principal Agent Relationship Among Three Participants in Venture Capital: Based on Entrepreneurs’ Overconfidence and Venture Capitalists’ Supervising Efforts

ZHA boa，GUO ju-eb，YAN Wen-juna

a.School of Management；b.The Key Lab of the Ministry of Education for Process Control ＆ Efficiency Engineering, School of Management, Xi’an Jiao tong University, Xi’an 710049, China

Received:2013-10-25 Revised:2014-01-06

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在不完全信息条件下，建立了风险投资公司、银行与创业企业三者之间的委托代理模型，证明了风险投资公司的监督比例存在一个临界值，并分析了创业企业家过度自信心理特征与风险投资公司监督努力对各参与方委托代理关系的影响作用。研究表明：在三方参与约束条件下，当风险投资公司监督比例小于临界值并且监督对投资成功的影响作用大于增值服务的作用时，风险投资公司的监督努力会提升创业企业和银行参与投资的意愿；创业企业家过度自信行为会提升银行和风险投资公司参与投资的意愿。在双向道德危害情况下，当风险投资公司监督比例小于临界值并且监督对投资成功的影响作用大于增值服务的作用时，风险投资公司的监督努力会提升其最优努力水平与权益分配比例；创业企业家过度自信行为会提升其最优努力水平，并会降低风险投资公司的最优权益分配比例。

关键词: 风险投资, 过度自信, 监督努力, 委托代理

Abstract: This paper establishes principal-agent relationships among venture capitalist, bank and entrepreneur under the condition of incomplete information, proves that there exist the critical value of venture capitalists’ supervision, and then analyzes the impact of entrepreneurs’ overconfidence, venture capitalists’ supervising efforts on the relationships among venture capitalist, bank and entrepreneur. It shows that, in case of three participants, when the proportion of venture capitalists’ supervision is smaller than the critical value and the effect of supervision from venture capitalist is greater than the effect of the added service function, venture capitalists’ supervision makes entrepreneur and bank more willing to be involved in the investment; entrepreneurs’ overconfidence makes venture capitalist and bank more willing to be involved in the investment; with double moral hazard, when the proportion of venture capitalists’ supervision is smaller than the critical value and the effect of supervision from venture capitalist is greater than the effect of the added service function, venture capitalists’ supervision makes their optimal effort level and proportion of optimal rights allocation become higher; entrepreneurs’ overconfidence makes their optimal effort level become higher while the proportion of venture capitalists’ optimal rights allocation will be reduced.

Key words: venture capital, overconfidence, supervising efforts, principal agent

查博a，郭菊娥b，晏文隽a. 风险投资三方委托代理关系——基于创业企业家过度自信与风投公司监督努力[J]. 系统管理学报, 2015, 24(2): 190-199.

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