关键词: 碳交易, 减排投资, 谎报, 成本信息不对称, 供应链协调

Abstract:

Considering different market powers, this paper contributes to cost misreporting strategies and coordination in two-echelon low-carbon supply chains where there exists the problem that the supplier who invests in carbon emission reduction under the cap-and-trade policy may take advantage of his private cost information to increase his own profit, which damages the performances of the retailer and the whole supply chain. It is found that the supply chain dominance does have an influence on the profit distribution between the supply chain members, the whole supply chain performance, and the supplier’s optimal cost misreporting strategies. The supplier will not misreport his cost information when he himself is the supply chain leader but misreports cost information in the retailer-led supply chain to maximize his profit under certain conditions. A type of linear compensation-punishment mechanism with fixed emission reduction depending on the wholesale price is proposed to coordinate this asymmetric phenomenon. With appropriate contractual parameters, the coordination mechanism can achieve a perfect coordination of the low-carbon supply chain and distribute the supply chain profit between the supplier and retailer freely while it motivates the supplier to feedback true cost information. Finally, the effects of misreporting factors on the supplier and the retailer’s profits are validated and discussed through numerical analysis.

Key words: cap-and -trade, emission reduction investment, miseporting, cost information asymmetry, supply chain coordination