关键词: 天然气市场, 买方寡头垄断, 天然气储备, 储备偏好

Abstract: China is currently the largest importer of natural gas in the world, but its gas reserves are relatively low compared with the European Union (EU). The gas reserves in China will rise significantly in the near future in response to uncertainties to ensure a reliable gas supply. A change of natural gas reserve level will cause a change of natural gas market demand, which will affect the strategy of the natural gas import in the EU after PNG is connected from Russia to China. The purpose of this paper is to theoretically analyze the potential influence of the change of natural gas reserve preference in China on the natural gas import game in different information structures. The research shows that only when China adjusts its reserve preference, can its benefit in a simultaneous game reach that of the leader in a Stackelberg game, and will the benefit of the EU be damaged in this case. When both China and the EU can adjust their reserve preferences, each equilibrium profit may be reduced by excessive reserves, but Russia may thus obtain more producer surplus. This paper also studies the quantitative property of the equilibrium price, the equilibrium import quantity, and the profit level. At the same time, it tested the validity and stability of the conclusions by using the relevant data of the natural gas market.

Key words: natural gas market, oligopsony, natural gas reserves, reserve preferences