关键词: 综合性平台, 劝说性广告, 定价, 横向差异化, 纵向差异化

Abstract: In view of the competition between self-operated seller and third-party seller on platform, this paper models persuasive advertising competition between self-operated seller and third-party seller, considering three scenarios: platform domination, third-party seller domination, and both parties have the same market position. The effects of horizontal differentiation, vertical differentiation, and advertising cost coefficient on optimal decision and profit are analyzed. The result shows that when the horizontal differentiation (the strength of consumer preference) increases, the platform price and advertising level increases, the advertising level of the third-party seller decreases, and the price decreases first and then increases. When both parties have the same market position, their price and advertising levels are equal, the price of both parties increases with the strength of consumer preference increasing, and the advertising level is independent on the strength of consumer preference. In addition, the platform (the third-party seller) price and advertising increase (decrease) with the vertical differentiation (the quality difference between the platform and the third-party seller) increasing, regardless of the market position. Moreover, the coefficient of advertising cost is not the higher the better. The profit of platform will increase with the coefficient of advertising cost only when the third-party seller dominates the market and the coefficient of advertising cost coefficient is sufficiently high.

Key words: hybrid platform, persuasive advertising, pricing, horizontal differentiation, vertical differentiation