关键词: 碳税, 碳交易, 市场恐慌, 债务网络

Abstract: From the intersecting perspective of carbon price volatility and market panic sentiment, and based on complex network theory, this paper develops a risk contagion model for corporate carbon trading networks under a coordinated carbon tax–carbon trading strategy. It theoretically analyzes how carbon prices and market panic influence counterparty risk contagion in carbon trading and simulates the disturbance effects of carbon price fluctuations, market panic intensity, and herd behavior. The findings indicate that under conditions of fluctuating compliance periods and insufficient carbon allowance fulfillment, the number of corporate bankruptcies exhibits an upward trend with volatility, leading to the largest scale of carbon trading counterparty risk contagion. In the same scenario, heterogeneity in asset size significantly affects the number of bankruptcies. Enhancing carbon risk awareness and consumer green preferences, along with reducing asset sell-offs and noise, and coordinating with moderate levels of negative media disclosure, information dissemination, and policy risk control, can effectively suppress counterparty risk contagion in carbon trading networks. When the carbon tax rate and the optimal carbon price under the coordinated carbon tax–trading strategy reach the same level, the emission reduction effect of the coordinated strategy is maximized, and the interactive effects among carbon price determinants have the least impact on counterparty risk contagion. Market panic sentiment amplifies the disruptive effect of carbon price on counterparty risk contagion, whereas carbon pricing can mitigate the disruptive effect of market panic on contagion among trading counterparties.

Key words: carbon tax, carbon trading, market panic, debt network