关键词: 市场入侵, 数据驱动营销, 代理销售, 转售

Abstract: The booming development of internet technology has pushed e-commerce platforms to begin implementing marketing activities based on big data analysis, which expands the potential market demand and attracts entrant manufacturer to encroach online market through the platform. This paper constructs a game-theoretical model for a supply chain consisting of an incumbent manufacturer, an entrant manufacturer, and a platform when the platform adopts the data-driven marketing activity, specifically considering three models according to choices of the entrant manufacturer: no encroachment, reselling encroachment, and agency selling encroachment. It explores the optimal encroachment strategy from the perspectives of entrant manufacturer and platform by analyzing the equilibrium solutions. The results show that both reselling encroachment and agency selling encroachment may be the optimal strategy. When data-driven marketing cost is high, as commission rate increases, the optimal encroachment strategy will change alternately along the path of “reselling→agency selling→reselling”, which always damages the platform’s profit but increases the entrant manufacturer’s profit. Counter-intuitively, under agency selling encroachment, the entrant manufacturer’s profit positively correlates with the commission rate when the data-driven marketing cost is low. Under certain conditions, entrant manufacturer reselling (agency selling) encroachment can increase incumbent manufacturer’s profit and realize Pareto improvement, which is in contrast to the findings of previous studies. Finally. it conducts three extended studies and verifies the robustness of the main results regarding the optimal encroachment strategy.

Key words: market encroachment, data-driven marketing, agency selling, reselling