关键词: 非合作博弈, LBS, 定向促销, 移动优惠券, 价格歧视

Abstract: Considering the fact that there are two asymmetric competitive manufacturers in the market, and the fact that strong brand manufacturers have more loyal consumers than weak brand ones, this paper studies the strategies of competitive manufacturers in issuing mobile targeted coupons based on LBS (location based services) for consumers, and discusses the impact of marginal targeting costs (including the face value of mobile coupons, targeting scope, and targeting consumer groups, etc.) on targeted promotion strategies, market equilibrium, and social welfare of manufacturers. The result shows that the marginal targeting cost will affect the mobile targeting strategies of manufacturers. Moreover, mobile targeting may not always lead to “prisoners’ dilemma”. In addition, the consumer surplus and social welfare are increased with location-based targeting promotion under certain conditions.

Key words: non-cooperative game, LBS (location based services), targeted promotion, mobile coupons, price discrimination