关键词: 绿色供应链, 政府环境补贴, 不同所有制企业竞争, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract:

In order to study the effects of government environmental subsidy on the performance of green supply chain, this paper, assuming that consumers have green preferences, establishes and solves three subsidy modes (no subsidy (NSC), subsidy to the local manufacturer (SCX), and subsidy to the FDI manufacturer (SCY)). Comparative studies and a numerical simulation show that government environmental subsidy has no fundamental difference in terms of the effect on the manufacturers. Government environmental subsidy can increase the green degree and demand of the product affected by the subsidy directly while it can be counterproductive to another product regardless of the ownership of the enterprise. Subsidies to FDI firms with lower green manufacturing costs can have more obvious spillover and crowding-out effects than subsidies to local firms with higher green manufacturing costs. The degree of competition between two manufacturers could amplify the effect of the above government environmental subsidy, but could not change it. The manufacturer’s profit is the highest in the direct subsidy mode and lowest when the government subsidizes the competitor. As far as retailer and the whole supply chain are concerned, their profits are highest in the SCY mode, followed by the SCX mode, and government subsidy have positive effects on channel profits of supply chain only when the intensity of subsidy is smaller.

Key words: green supply chain, government environmental subsidy, competition between enterprises of diferent ownership, Stackelberg game