关键词: 机构投资者“分心”, 大股东掏空, 公司治理, 信息不对称

Abstract: Based on limited attention theory, this paper examines the significant impact of institutional investors’ attention diversion (referred to as distraction) on the major shareholders’ tunneling behavior in Chinese A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2007 to 2022. The findings reveal that institutional investors’ distraction significantly exacerbates the tunneling behavior of major shareholders. This effect increases under conditions of financial distress and decreases with greater media coverage. The mechanism underlying this relationship is that distraction reduces corporate governance and increases information asymmetry, thus leading to more tunneling behavior of major shareholders. Moreover, distraction intensifies the damage caused by major shareholders’ tunneling behavior to the value of companies, although this moderating effect appears with a time lag. Firms with a high degree of tax avoidance and elevated information processing cost should be more cautious about the exacerbating effect of institutional investors’ distraction. The findings provide important implications for regulatory authorities to formulate relevant policies and effectively alleviate the tunneling behavior of major shareholders in Chinese listed companies.

Key words: institutional investors’ distraction, tunneling, corporate governance, information asymmetry