关键词: 需求信息共享, 运营决策, 供应链协调

Abstract: When the probability distribution function of random demand is not completely known, retailers can deduce the demand according to the historical demand data. If the retailer does not share the demand data with the manufacturer, the latter can only infer the demand based on the historical order data. This paper studies the price decision of the manufacturer under the condition of whether there is historical information or not, the corresponding order decision of the retailer, and the demand information sharing decision among members of the supply chain. The result shows that when the demand information is asymmetric and the demand inference of the manufacturer is too high, the manufacturer will set a higher wholesale price, the expected profit of the retailer will be less than that when sharing demand information with the manufacturer, and the retailer is more likely to share demand information with the manufacturer. Besides, this paper further analyzes the coordination mechanism of encouraging the retailer to share demand information and increasing the profit of the supply chain.

Key words: demand information sharing, operational decision, supply chain coordination