关键词: 沙漠化治理, 沙产业, 微分博弈, 治理技术授权

Abstract: Based on the dynamic changes of desertification control scale and enterprise goodwill, a differential game model of desertification control between two competing enterprises is constructed. The product pricing, the desertification control investment level, the desertification control scale, and the revenue changes of both parties are studied in different governance technology authorization modes. It is found that the optimal pricing of products with desert characteristics of the two enterprises and the investment level of the technology licensor are not affected by the technology authorization mode. Without technical authorization, the revenues of both enterprises are the lowest. In the license fee technology authorization mode, the investment level and desertification control scale of the licensee and the revenues of both enterprises are improved, and the revenue growth rate of the licensee is greater than that of the licensor. In the fixed fee technology authorization mode, the investment level, the desertification control scale of the authorized party, and the revenues of the two enterprises are the highest, and the desertification control scale of the two enterprises are the same at this time.

Key words: desertification control, sand industry, differential game, technology authorization