系统管理学报

系统管理学报 ›› 2020, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (1): 1-11.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1005-2542.2020.01.001

• 企业管理 •    下一篇

管理中的机制设计

陈冰瑶，荣立松，孙彭，陈剑   

  1. 清华大学经济管理学院，北京100084； 杜克大学富卡商学院，美国达勒姆27708
  • 出版日期:2020-01-29 发布日期:2020-05-14
  • 作者简介:陈冰瑶（1989-），女，博士生。研究方向为机制设计与运营管理。

Mechanism Design in Management

CHEN Bingyao, RONG Lisong, SUN Peng, CHEN Jian   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing100084, China:  Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham 27708, United States
  • Online:2020-01-29 Published:2020-05-14

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摘要： 管理中不同利益主体间的信息不对称会导致激励扭曲等问题。如果不能设计有效的机制，则无法实现预期的目标，甚至造成灾难性的后果。从管理实践中的典型事件出发，总结和探索造成问题的机制的主要缺陷；简述了机制设计的基本概念、主要理论和发展过程。针对机制设计在管理问题中的应用研究进行了回顾和总结，主要包括单代理人或多代理人在静态或动态环境下的机制设计问题。最后，讨论了未来值得进一步研究的方向。

关键词: 机制设计, 采购, 销售, 信息不对称

Abstract: Information asymmetry among participants in a managerial system may cause incentive distortion and other problems. If an effective mechanism cannot be designed, the expected goal cannot be achieved or even disastrous consequences may be caused. Starting from typical events in management practice, this paper summarized and explored the main defects of the mechanism causing problems, and briefly described the basic concepts, main theories, and development process of mechanism design. Moreover, it reviewed and summarized the application research of mechanism design in management problems, mainly including the mechanism design of single agent or multi-agent in static or dynamic environment. Furthermore, it discussed future research directions.

Key words: mechanism design, procurement, selling, information asymmetry

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