Abstract: The vertical cooperative advertising problem in a dual-channel supply chain is studied by using Stackelberg game models, aiming at the realistic background that manufacturer shares the cost of offline retailer’s local advertising, taking into account the cooperative advertising plan of online retail platform. The bilateral vertical cooperative advertising model and the dual-channel supply chain cooperative advertising model considering the fairness concern of offline retailers are studied respectively based on the unilateral vertical cooperative advertising model. The results show that the cost sharing of online retail platforms does not always promote the improvement of manufacturer’s national advertising investment and overall profit. When the participation rate of online retail platforms is large, manufacturer’s participation in the cooperative advertising plan is also beneficial to increase the profit of offline retailer. The offline retailer’s fairness concern behavior will increase his/her investment in local advertising, but it does not always improve his/her perceived equity utility. When the marginal profit of manufacturer’s offline channel is large, the excessive fairness concern of offline retailer is conducive to increase manufacturer’s profit.

Key words: dual-channel supply chain, online retail platform, vertical cooperative advertising, fairness concern

摘要： 针对制造商在分担线下零售商促销广告成本的同时还考虑参与网络零售平台合作广告计划的现实背景，运用Stackelberg博弈模型研究了双渠道供应链中的垂直合作广告问题。以单边垂直合作广告模型为基准，分别研究了双边垂直合作广告模型和考虑线下零售商公平关切的双渠道供应链合作广告模型。研究发现：网络零售平台的成本分担并不总是促进制造商全国性广告投入水平和整体利润的提升，当网络零售平台的分担比例较大时，制造商参与网络零售平台合作广告计划也有利于线下零售商利润的提升；线下零售商的公平关切行为特征会提升其促销广告的投入水平，但并不总能提升其感知公平效用；当制造商线下渠道的边际利润较大时，线下零售商过高程度的公平关切反而有利于制造商利润的提升。

关键词: 双渠道供应链, 网络零售平台, 垂直合作广告, 公平关切