Abstract:

Based on the perspective of executive agency, this paper explores the motivation of market mispricing to increase merger and acquisition (M&A) in China. Using A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2019 as the research samples, it is found that the intermediary role of M&A in the impact of stock market mispricing on executive compensation is established, which means executives will increase the “tunneling behavior” of M&A to obtain a higher compensation when the M&A company is overvalued. In addition, the degree of financing constraints positively moderates the intermediary role of M&A between stock market mispricing and executive compensation. That is, executives of listed companies with a higher level of financing constraints have stronger motivations to gain private interests by catering to market M&A. However, M&A when the stock price is overvalued does not increase the M&A performance of listed companies. This paper not only provides ideas for improving executive compensation incentive and supervision and reducing inefficient investment behaviors, but also has an important significance understanding the effect of capital market on the investment and financing strategies of companies.

Key words:

capital market mispricing, merger and acquisition (M&A), agency problem, financing constraint

摘要：

基于高管代理问题视角，探究中国资本市场错误定价增加并购的动机。以2007~2019年A股上市公司为研究样本，研究结果表明：并购在资本市场错误定价对高管薪酬影响的中介作用成立，即并购公司股价被高估程度越大，高管增加并购这种“隧道行为”获取更高薪酬动机更强；融资约束程度正向调节并购在资本市场错误定价与高管薪酬间的中介作用，即融资约束程度更高的上市公司高管在公司股价被高估时增加并购获取私利的动机更强；但长期来看，股价被高估时进行的并购并不能增加上市公司并购绩效。研究对完善高管薪酬激励与监督以及减少非效率投资行为提供了思路，对洞察资本市场如何影响公司投融资策略也具有重要意义。

关键词:

资本市场错误定价, 并购, 代理问题, 融资约束