Abstract: Complex products, which are central to the high-end equipment manufacturing industry, require significantly higher standards of aftermarket service quality compared to standard products. This creates a challenge for the main manufacturer, as it must incentivize aftermarket vendors to enhance collaborative cooperation, improve aftermarket service quality, and further elevate their quality control practices. This paper, based on the collaborative cooperation model of the “main manufacturer-aftermarket vendors” relationship, applies the Stackelberg game theory to construct a collaborative cooperation model where the main manufacturer acts as the leader and the aftermarket vendors act as the followers, from the perspective of incentivizing the aftermarket vendor by the main manufacturer. It examines the influence of quality cost-sharing strategy on the optimal decision-making of the main manufacturer and aftermarket vendors and investigates the impact of the main manufacturer’s effort cost coefficient and profit coefficient on the quality control outcomes. The results show that the main manufacturer, in addition to providing technical support, continues to implement the quality cost-sharing incentive, which facilitates strengthened collaboration between the main manufacturer and aftermarket vendors, improves aftermarket service quality, and achieves Pareto improvement. However, the quality cost-sharing ratio between achieving the optimal profit and the optimal aftermarket service quality for the main manufacturer is inconsistent. Only when the quality cost-sharing ratio remains within a certain threshold range can both “quality control” and “economic interests” be effectively balanced. Additionally, the main manufacturer can optimize its quality control level by improving supervisory control efficiency, reducing unit effort cost, and enhancing unit quality returns.

Key words: complex products, “main manufacturer-aftermarket vendors” model, aftermarket service, quality control, quality cost-sharing, control optimization

摘要： 复杂产品作为高端装备制造业的主要产品形式，其对于售后服务质量要求远远高于普通产品，故主制造商如何激励售后服务商加强协同合作，改进售后服务质量水平，以及主制造商如何进一步提升自身质量控制水平成为难点。基于“主制造商-售后服务商”协同合作模式，从主制造商激励售后服务商的视角，运用Stackelberg博弈理论，构建了主制造商为领导者、售后服务商为跟随者的协同合作模型，研究了质量成本分担策略对主售双方最优决策的影响，并考察了主制造商努力成本系数和收益系数对质量控制水平的影响。结果表明：主制造商在技术支持基础上实施质量成本分担激励，能够促进主售双方加强合作，改进售后服务质量水平并实现帕累托改进。然而，主制造商实现最优利润和最优售后服务质量的质量成本分担比例并不一致，只有当分担比例保持在一定阈值范围时，才能兼顾“质量控制”与“经济利益”。并且，主制造商通过改进督导管控效率，降低单位努力成本，提升单位质量收益，可以优化其质量控制水平。

关键词: 复杂产品, “主-售”模式, 售后服务, 质量控制, 质量成本分担, 控制优化