Abstract: This paper analyzes the allocation of carbon allowances by governments and the selection of remanufacturing modes by original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) within the context of intellectual property protection. It constructs a game model of manufacturing/remanufacturing and their evolutionary game models to analyze the stable strategy for the system. The findings indicate that when the government uses the grandfather method to allocate carbon allowances, it contributes to reducing environmental impact and achieving optimal environmental benefits. Similarly, when the OEM adopts the strategy of outsourcing remanufacturing, it can maximize profits. After the model evolution, the entire system stabilizes with the strategy combination {grandfather method, outsourcing remanufacturing}, leading to a win-win outcome for both parties. In addition, if the government adopts the benchmarking method for enterprises with low carbon emissions, an increase in carbon trading prices would lower the prices of both new and remanufactured products, resulting in decreased sales of remanufactured products. However, when carbon trading prices under the benchmarking method exceed those under the grandfathering method, the environmental impact of outsourcing remanufacturing decreases. The increase in carbon trading prices, consumer preference for environmentally-friendly products, and the carbon emission reductions of remanufactured products would encourage both the government and the OEM pursue strategies that promote system stability. Furthermore, the greater the carbon emissions of new products, the recycling cost coefficient of waste product, and the carbon emission baseline, the more likely the government is to select the grandfathering approach.

Key words: intellectual property protection, authorized remanufacturing, outsourced remanufacturing, carbon allowance allocation methods, evolutionary games

摘要：

为探究知识产权保护下政府碳配额分配方式与原始制造商再制造模式选择问题，构建制造/再制造博弈模型与双方演化博弈模型，以分析系统演化稳定策略。研究发现：对于政府而言，选择历史法进行免费碳配额分配有利于降低环境影响，实现最优的环境效益；对于原始制造商而言，选取外包再制造有利于实现利润最大化。经过演化，系统在策略组合{历史法,外包再制造}中达到稳定，双方实现共赢的策略选择。若政府选择基准法，对于低碳排放企业而言，碳交易价格的提高会降低产品售价，进而导致再制造产品销量下降。只有当碳交易价格高于历史法下的价格时，外包再制造的环境影响才能更小。此外，碳交易价格、消费者绿色消费偏好、再制造产品碳减排水平的提高会促进政府和原始制造商更快达到系统稳定策略。新产品碳排放、废旧产品回收成本规模系数和碳排放基准水平越高，政府越倾向于选择历史法。

关键词: 知识产权保护, 授权再制造, 外包再制造, 碳配额分配方式, 演化博弈