Journal of Systems & Management ›› 2026, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (1): 190-204.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.2097-4558.2026.01.014

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Consumer Data Sharing to Enable Product Innovation for Suppliers Incentive Contract Design

XING Qingsong1,2, Wang Jing1, DENG Fumin2   

  1. 1.School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074 China; 2. Business School, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China
  • Received:2024-02-02 Revised:2024-07-21 Online:2026-01-28 Published:2026-02-12

消费者数据共享赋能供应商产品创新的激励契约设计

邢青松1,2,王静1,邓富民2
  

  1. 1.重庆交通大学 经济与管理学院,重庆  400074;2.四川大学 商学院,成都 610065
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金青年项目(71401019);重庆市自然科学基金面上项目(CSTB2023NSCQ-MSX0944);重庆市教委人文社会科学项目(23SKJD082)

Abstract: Faced with the negative effects of data sharing transfer costs and the consumer surplus extraction caused by “big data-enabled price discrimination” under data monopolies, e-commerce platforms encounter “data sharing decision dilemma” when sharing consumer data to empower supplier product innovation. To address this, the paper develops a dynamic game model involving suppliers, e-commerce platforms, and heterogeneous consumers, analyzes the decision-making of e-commerce platforms on consumer data sharing levels under competitive environments, explores the effects of product innovation levels and inter-platform price competition intensity on data-sharing decision-making, determines the upper and lower bounds of platforms on consumer data-sharing levels, and further explores the optimal data-sharing decision of the system from a supply chain perspective. Based on this framework, it demonstrates the existence of feasible incentive intervals for consumer data-sharing on platforms and specifies the conditions for implementing such incentives in different scenarios. The results show that data sharing effectively promotes product innovation, and product innovation level is the key factor for platforms to decide whether to proactively share consumer data. When inter-platform price competition is relatively weak and product innovation is within a certain range, there is potential to increase the consumer data-sharing level. Under these conditions, designing data-sharing incentives can effectively increase the willingness of competitive e-commerce platforms to share data. The ease of implementation data-sharing incentive mechanisms depends on the product innovation level, and the flexible allocation of the additional profits generated in the supply chain allows for increasing platform data sharing while achieving Pareto improvements for supply chain members.

Key words: data sharing, e-commerce platforms, product innovation, incentive design

摘要: 面对数据共享转移成本带来的负效应,以及数据垄断下“大数据杀熟”行为对消费者剩余的攫取,电商平台在共享消费者数据以赋能供应商产品创新过程中,陷入“数据共享决策困境”。基于此,本文构建了供应商、电商平台与异质性消费者之间的动态博弈模型,分析竞争环境下电商平台的数据共享水平决策,探讨产品创新水平与电商平台间价格竞争强度等因素对电商平台消费者数据共享水平决策的影响,确定平台消费者数据共享水平的上下确界,并进一步从供应链视角考察系统的最优数据共享决策。在此基础上,论证平台消费者数据共享激励可行区间的存在性,并给出不同情形下的激励实施条件。研究结果表明:数据共享能够有效促进产品创新,且产品创新水平是平台决定是否主动共享消费者数据的关键因素;当平台间价格竞争较弱,且产品创新水平处于一定区间时,平台的消费者数据共享水平存在提升空间,此时设计数据共享激励能够有效增强竞争性电商平台的数据共享意愿;数据共享激励设计的实施难易程度受产品创新水平影响,双方能够对供应链系统所增加的利润进行柔性分配,在提升平台数据共享水平的同时,实现供应链成员的帕累托改进。

关键词: 数据共享, 电商平台, 产品创新, 激励设计

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