Abstract: The connection between supply chains, economic activities, and social life is becoming increasingly close. Terrorists may exploit freight systems to detonate destructive weapons, targeting densely populated areas and critical infrastructure, thereby posing serious security threats. Enhancing the capacity to respond to such risks requires interventions from the logistics security system. However, few studies systematically analyze supply chain security from the perspective of cooperation between government and enterprises. To address this gap, this paper applies game-theoretic models to supply chain logistics scenarios, investigating the mechanisms by which public-private partnership (PPP) models enhance emergency management effectiveness. The findings reveal that under a non-cooperative model, corporate supply chain security management tends to suffer from “principal responsibility failure”. In contrast, a government-dominated model may lead to emergency management efforts that are only formally rational, lacking substantive effectiveness. By comparison, public-private cooperation emerges as a key approach to improving supply chain security. Within such a cooperative framework, enterprises are better positioned to focus on specific emergency scenarios, while the role of government shifts from “regulation” to “governance”.

Key words: emergency management, supply chain security, public-private partnership (PPP)

摘要： 随着供应链与经济活动及社会生活的关联日益紧密，恐怖分子可能利用货运系统引爆杀伤性武器，对人员密集场所与关键设施实施袭击，从而构成恐怖主义威胁。为此，必须从物流安全系统着手，全面提升应对供应链风险的能力。然而，鲜有研究从政府与企业协同层面，系统探讨供应链安全情况。基于此，本文聚焦供应链物流场景，运用博弈理论模型，分析公私合作保障模式对提升应急管理效能的作用机制。研究结果表明：在缺乏合作的情境下，企业供应链安全管理易出现“主体责任”失灵的问题；在政府全面包揽的模式下，应急管理投入往往仅具备形式上的合理性与目标适配性。相比之下，公私合作模式是增强供应链安全的关键举措。在该合作架构下，企业更专注于具体应急场景的应对，而政府重心则从“规制”转向“治理”。

关键词: 应急管理, 供应链安全, 公私合作