Abstract: This paper builds a signal game model of collaborative research and development for complex products under government subsidy based on the generic technology to analyze the strategy selection mechanism and its influencing factors, in order to enhance the innovation resources allocation efficiency and bring into full play the leverage of government subsidies. The results indicate that due to information incompleteness, there appear to be three kinds of perfect Bayesian equilibriums: complete failure, partial success, and complete success in the game of collaborative research and development of supply chain and government complex products based on the generic technology, and the equilibriums are mainly affected by the disguise cost and risk cost. Therefore, the key to achieving a completely successful game equilibrium is to increase the cost of disguise cost and risk cost of supply chain. Based on the results, this paper puts forward relevant suggestions from establishing the notification and commitment systems, perfecting the subsidy approval and payment mechanism, and increasing the intensity of spot check and punishment for fraud. Finally, it puts forward the research deficiency and directions for further research.

Key words: government subsidy, generic technology, collaborative research and development, complex products, signal game

摘要： 为提升创新资源的配置效率、发挥政府补贴的杠杆作用，在政府研发补贴下，构建了供应链与政府补贴的复杂产品共性技术协同研发信号博弈模型，并对双方策略选择及其影响因素进行了分析。研究结果表明：由于信息的不完全性，供应链与政府复杂产品共性技术协同研发博弈出现完全失灵、部分成功及完全成功3种完美贝叶斯均衡，且均衡主要受到伪装成本和风险成本的影响，故实现完全成功的博弈均衡关键是提高供应链作假的伪装成本和风险成本。根据研究结论，从建立告知与承诺制度、完善补贴审批与支付机制及加大抽查与作假惩罚力度3个方面提出相关建议。最后，提出研究不足及进一步研究方向。

关键词: 政府补贴, 共性技术, 协同研发, 复杂产品, 信号博弈