关键词: 地方政府融资平台, 债务展期, 债务重构, 策略选择, 福利影响

Abstract: In the debt structure of Local Government Financing Platforms (LGFPs), LGFPs are the nominal debtors while local governments are implicit contingent debtors. In the debt extension restructuring of LGFPs, whether local governments acknowledge or implement their contingent guarantee obligations may change the repayment source of LGFPs and affect the repayment expectation of banks. This paper describes the effects of the implicit compensation expectation of local governments on the debt extension modes and related welfares. It is concluded that when the renewal debt is expected to be difficult to get paid, LGFPs will prefer “self-repayment-style debt extension” which is paid off only by LGFPs, but banks prefer “compound-style debt extension” which is paid off jointly by LGFPs and local governments. In this case, LGFPs are inclined to leave aside the contingent guarantee obligations of local governments, but banks are eager to implement the aforementioned obligations. Besides, when the renewal debt is expected to be fully paid off, LGFPs will prefer “compound-style debt extension”, but banks prefer “self-repayment-style debt extension”. It seems that banks prefer the enhancement and improvement of the self-repayment ability of LGFPs, rather than the additional supplement of local governments in the way of improving solvency. Moreover, from the perspective of LGFPs and banks, the “compound-style debt extension” is better than “self-repayment-style debt extension”. As a co-decision maker, they have strong incentives to take advantage of the interests of local governments. Furthermore, although debt extension contributes to temporarily ease the repayment pressure of LGFPs and create time or conditions to regain solvency etc., it can only adjust the distribution structure of related welfares but does not help to improve the overall welfare of all participants.

Key words: local government financing platforms (LGFPs), debt extension, debt restructuring, strategy selection, welfare effect