系统管理学报

系统管理学报 ›› 2026, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (1): 72-84.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.2097-4558.2026.01.006

• 工业工程与工程管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于计算实验的重大工程风险管理激励效率演化分析——考虑保险机构的参与

时茜茜1,2，姚隆玉1,2，李博雅1,2，朱建波3   

  1. 1. 南京航空航天大学 经济与管理学院，南京 211106；2. 南京航空航天大学 能源软科学研究中心，南京 211106；3. 东南大学 土木工程学院，南京 211189
  • 收稿日期:2024-04-10 修回日期:2024-06-02 出版日期:2026-01-28 发布日期:2026-02-12
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目（72301132，72101055）；江苏省社会科学基金资助项目（20GLC019）；国家资助博士后研究人员计划（GZC20240247）；江苏省卓越博士后计划资助项目（2024ZB176）；中国博士后科学基金面上项目（2024M750456）；中央高校基本科研业务费（NR2023004）；南京航空航天大学研究生科研与实践创新计划资助项目（xcxjh20230917）

Evolutionary Analysis of Incentive Efficiency in Mega Project Risk Management Based on Computational Experiments: Considering the Role of Insurance Institutions

SHI Qianqian1,2, YAO Longyu1,2, LI Boya1,2, ZHU Jianbo3   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211106, China; 2. Research Center for Soft Energy Science, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211106, China; 3. School of Civil Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China
  • Received:2024-04-10 Revised:2024-06-02 Online:2026-01-28 Published:2026-02-12

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摘要： 针对重大工程建设面临的高风险暴露特征，并考虑保险机构参与现场风险管理的潜在动能，构建了保险机构介入下业主与承包商群体的多周期激励模型。研究采用计算实验方法,模拟了不同情景下各主体的风险管理行为演化，探究了公平偏好、激励机制及保险机构参与等因素对风险管理激励效率的影响。研究发现：承包商的公平偏好心理显著影响激励效果；业主与保险机构采取动态激励方式显著优于静态恒定激励；保险机构主动参与能有效促进承包商的风险管理努力行为，提升各参与方收益。研究结果为重大工程风险管理实践提供了新的理论视角与决策参考。

关键词: 重大工程保险, 风险管理, 激励, 计算实验

Abstract: In response to the high-risk exposure in mega projects and considering the potential role of insurance institutions in onsite risk management, this paper develops a multi-period incentive model for owners and contractor groups under the participation of insurance institutions. Based on a computational experimental approach, it simulates the evolution of risk management behaviors of different stakeholders under various scenarios, exploring the effects of fairness preferences, incentive mechanisms, and insurance participation on the efficiency of risk management incentives. The results indicate that the fairness preference of contractors significantly impacts incentive effectiveness. Dynamic incentives implemented by owners and insurance institutions are significantly more effective than static, constant incentives. Proactive participation by insurance institutions effectively promotes the risk management efforts of mega projects, enhancing the payoffs of all parties involved. These findings offer new theoretical insights and decision-making guidance for risk management in mega projects.

Key words: mega project insurance, risk management, incentives, computational experiments

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