Abstract: A contract-farming supply chain model between a single company and a single farmer was established, and financing equilibriums of the model was analyzed when the farmer is faced with capital constraints. Considering the uncertainty of wholesale price, the possibility of the company in breaking the contract, and the moral hazard of the farmer, the decision-making of the amount of agricultural investment of the farmer when facing the financial constraints and the pricing strategy of the company were studied. It is found that the mean value of wholesale price in random market affects the equilibrium decision-making. The problem of the financial constrains of the farmer can be ignored if the moral hazard of the farmer is not considered. However, if the moral hazard of the farmer is considered, the farmer can always improve his profit through financing. However, both the interest of the company and the interest of the whole supply chain may be damaged by the financing behavior of the farmer under certain conditions. The company should lend agricultural funds to the farmer to avoid this phenomenon.

Key words: moral hazard, financial constraint, financing equilibrium, contract-farming

摘要： 构建了由单个公司和单个农户组成的订单农业供应链模型，研究农户面临资金约束时订单农业供应链的融资均衡。考虑到农产品的市场批发价不确定、公司可能违约，以及农户存在道德风险的情，对面临资金约束农户的农资投入量决策以及公司的定价策略进行分析。研究结果表明，随机市场批发价的均值会影响均衡决策；不考虑农户道德风险时农户的资金约束问题可以忽略。考虑农户的道德风险时农户总能通过融资改善利润，但一定条件下公司和整条供应链的利益却可能会因为农户融资而受损，公司应该出借农资给农户来避免这一现象。

关键词: 道德风险, 资金约束, 融资均衡, 订单农业