Abstract:

Based on the model of the optimal auction mechanism, this paper establishes a unilateral auction model for the secondary emission trading market by introducing pollution emissions, pollution reduction, and production investment behaviors and by considering multiple units of pollutant emission rights. Besides, it studies the choice of the optimal multi-item auction mechanism and its differences in two types of emission abatement technologies, and further compares the efficiency differences between the optimal multi-unit auction mechanism and the current single-unit auction mechanism. The results show that when the polluting firm uses end-pipe abatement technologies, the seller’s revenue under the condition of uniform price auction is less than the seller’s income under the condition of discriminatory price auction, and the optimal auction mechanism is discriminate price auction. When the polluting firm adopts the clean process emission reduction technology, the seller’s revenue under the condition of uniform price auction is greater than that under the condition of discriminatory price auction, and the optimal auction mechanism is uniform price auction. No matter which emission abatement technologies are used, the efficiency of multi-unit auction mechanism in emissions trading is always higher than that of the current single-unit auction mechanism.

Key words: emission auction, mechanism design, abatement technology

摘要：

引入企业污染排放、污染削减、生产投入等行为，考虑多单位排污权需求，并将减排技术细分为清洁工艺和末端治理技术两类，构建排污权二级交易市场多物品拍卖模型，研究排污企业采用末端和清洁工艺两类减排技术时的最优多物品拍卖机制选择及其差异，并进一步比较了最优多物品拍卖机制和现有单物品拍卖机制的效率差异。研究结果表明：当排污企业采用末端减排技术，统一价格拍卖下的卖方收益小于歧视价格拍卖下的卖方收益，最优拍卖机制为歧视价格拍卖；当排污企业采用清洁工艺减排技术，统一价格拍卖下的卖方收益大于歧视价格拍卖下的卖方收益，最优拍卖机制为统一价格拍卖。无论采用哪种减排技术，排污权交易中使用多物品拍卖机制的效率总是高于现有的单物品拍卖机制。

关键词: 排污权拍卖, 机制设计, 减排技术