系统管理学报

Journal of Systems & Management ›› 2021, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (4): 643-652.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1005-2542.2021.04.004

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Incentive Contracts for Integrated Facility Management Service Supplier in BIM Context

TANG Hongxia, CAO Jiming, SHAO Zhiguo   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management; Sustainable Development and New Urbanization Think-Tank, Shanghai 200092, China; 2. School of Management Engineering, Qingdao University of Technology, Qingdao 266520, Shandong, China
  • Online:2021-07-28 Published:2021-08-05

BIM情境下综合设施管理服务供应商激励契约

汤洪霞，曹吉鸣，邵志国   

  1. 1.同济大学经济与管理学院；可持续发展与新型城镇化智库，上海 200092；2.青岛理工大学 管理工程学院，山东 青岛 266520
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目（71874123，71974122）；教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目（17YJC630184）

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Abstract: In order to effectively motivate integrated facility management (IFM) service suppliers to apply building information modeling (BIM) for IFM outsourcing service and realize the application value of BIM in the IFM process and the IFM project performance, a multi-task principal-agent model is built on IFM service suppliers’ two service tasks of BIM system operation and IFM business consulting during IFM outsourcing with BIM application based on the principal-agent theory. Relying on this model, the incentive contracts are analyzed in the three incentive modes in which the cost of the two service tasks is independent, interdependent, and interchangeable. Combining with the model calculation and MATLAB simulation results, the optimal incentive mode and its incentive contract are identified. The research shows that incentive contracts in the different modes have different incentive effects on IFM service suppliers, and have different impacts on the IFM outsourcing performance of owners. The optimal incentive contracts in the three incentive modes are ranked from high to low as the optimal incentive contract in the cost interdependent mode, the optimal incentive contract in the cost independent mode, and the optimal incentive contract in the cost interchangeable mode. Owners should select the suitable incentive model and contract to incentivize IFM service suppliers, and as the service capability and IFM project performance increase, the incentive from owners increase.

Key words: BIM context, integrated facility management (IFM), service supplier, incentive model, incentive contract

摘要： 为有效激励综合设施管理（Integrated Facility Management，IFM）服务供应商应用BIM进行IFM外包服务，实现BIM在IFM过程中的应用价值与IFM项目绩效，基于委托代理理论，针对IFM外包BIM应用过程中IFM服务供应商需要执行的BIM系统运营服务和IFM业务咨询服务两项任务，构建多任务委托代理模型；依托模型，分析在两项服务任务成本相互独立、相互依存及相互替代等三种激励模式下的激励契约；结合模型计算与MATLAB仿真结果，辨识最优的激励模式及激励契约。研究表明：3种模式下的激励契约将对IFM服务供应商产生不同的激励效果，并对业主方IFM项目造成差异性绩效；3种激励模式下的最优激励契约由高到低排序为：成本相互依存模式下的最优激励契约>成本相互独立模式下的最优激励契约>成本相互替代模式下的最优激励契约；业主方应选取合适的激励模式与契约对IFM服务供应商进行激励，且其服务能力与IFM项目绩效越高，业主方对其激励将越大。

关键词: BIM情境, 综合设施管理, 服务供应商, 激励模式, 激励契约

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