Abstract:

Taking the step-by-step expansion of security financing in China as natural experimental scenarios, this paper investigates the impact of the introduction of short selling mechanism on the controlling shareholders’ pledge willingness and extent, taking the A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2020 as samples, and using the difference-in-difference model and staggered difference-in-difference model. The results show that the enforcement of short selling has a significant inhibition effect on equity pledge of controlling shareholders. The mechanism test shows that via reducing corporate information asymmetry and improving the quality of accounting information, the short selling mechanism restrains stock pledge of controlling shareholders, and promotes corporate internal control, which backs up the “information enhancement effect” and the “governance effect” of short selling. Additional analyses indicate that the governance effect is more pronounced in companies with severe financing constraints, higher stock-holding for large shareholders, higher degree of industry competition and in private enterprises. The conclusion is conducive to the profound understanding of the market function of short selling and provide empirical evidence for the scientific regulation of equity pledge in China’s capital market.

Key words: short selling, controlling shareholder, equity pledge, information enhancement effect, governance effect

摘要：

以中国融资融券标的股票分步扩容为自然实验事件，选取2003~2020年沪深A股上市公司为样本，运用双重差分模型（DID）和多时点双重差分模型考察了卖空机制引入对控股股东股权质押意愿和程度的影响。研究结果显示：实施融券卖空交易机制对控股股东股权质押行为具有显著抑制作用。由机制检验结果发现，融券机制通过降低外部信息不对称来抑制控股股东股权质押行为，并促进公司内部控制质量的提高，支持卖空机制的“信息增益效应”和“治理效应”；进一步研究发现，在融资约束较强、大股东持股比例较高、行业竞争度较高及民营企业中，卖空机制抑制股权质押行为的治理效应更加显著。研究结论有助于深刻认识融券卖空机制的市场功能，为科学规范中国资本市场股权质押行为提供了经验证据。

关键词: 融券卖空, 控股股东, 股权质押, 信息增益效应, 治理效应