Journal of Systems & Management ›› 2024, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (2): 341-355.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1005-2542.2024.02.005

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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Shared Manufacturing Quality Synergy in Different Cost-Benefit Allocation Mechanisms

ZHANG Ziming1,WANG Xinping1,SU Chang2,SUN Linhui1   

  1. 1. School of Management,Xi’an University of Science and Technology,Xi’an 710054,China;2 School of Safety Science and Engineering,Xi’an University of Science and Technology,Xi’an 710054,China
  • Received:2022-09-08 Revised:2022-10-13 Online:2024-03-28 Published:2024-04-02

不同成本收益摊配机制下共享制造质量协同演化博弈

张子鸣1,王新平1,苏畅2,孙林辉1   

  1. 1.西安科技大学管理学院,西安 710054;2 西安科技大学安全科学与工程学院,西安 710054
  • 基金资助:

    国家社会科学基金资助项目(20BJY109);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(22YJAZH104

Abstract:

This paper, considering the impact of decision maker’s cost-benefit perception bias on quality decision, and introducing the prospect theory and mental account theory into the shared manufacturing multi-subject evolutionary game process, builds a shared manufacturing quality synergy game model in different cost-benefit allocation mechanisms, and analyzes the dynamic evolutionary law of each game subject. The results show that the quality synergy improvement of shared manufacturing is the result of multiple factors, which is not only influenced by external factors, but also regulated by the decision maker’s own subjective factors. Cost-benefit allocation mechanisms can effectively change the evolutionary stability of shared manufacturing quality synergy, of which, the dynamic cost-benefit allocation mechanism is the most effective. The introduction of incentive mechanisms can effectively fill the effectiveness gap of the cost-benefit allocation mechanisms and promote the evolution and development of the stable strategy in the shared decision-making system towards “Pareto optimality”.

Key words:

cost-benefit perception bias, shared manufacturing, quality synergy, evolutionary game

摘要:

考虑决策者成本-收益感知偏差对质量决策的影响,将前景理论和心理账户理论引入共享制造多主体演化博弈过程中,构建不同成本收益摊配机制下共享制造质量协同演化博弈模型,分析各博弈主体动态演化规律。研究结果表明:共享制造质量协同提升是多因素共同作用的结果,不仅受到外部因素的影响,还受决策者自身主观因素的调节;成本收益摊配机制能够有效改变共享制造质量协同演化的稳定状态,其中动态成本收益摊配机制的效力最优;激励机制的引入可以有效弥补成本收益摊配机制的效力空白,促使共享决策系统稳定策略向“帕累托最优”方向演化发展。

关键词:

成本-收益感知偏差, 共享制造, 质量协同, 演化博弈

CLC Number: