Abstract:

There are two models of resale and agency to choose when manufacturers introduce livestreaming channels, and livestreaming-retailers also have two livestreaming marketing methods to choose: non-selection and selection. When making decisions to maximize their own profits, conflicts of interest are inevitable. Aiming at the problem of optimal decision-making and coordination when the sales model (resale/agency) is combined with the livestreaming marketing methods (non-curated/curated), a two-echelon game model consisting of manufacturers and livestreaming retailers is established to compare the optimal decision-making of the members of the livestreaming supply chain selected by different sales models of manufacturers and different marketing methods of livestreaming retailers, and to design coordination contracts for these members. It is found that regardless of the manufacturer’s choice of resale or agency sale model, when the product similarity is less than a certain threshold, curated methods are the optimal decision for retailers. The retail price, market demand, supply chain members, and overall profit of curated methods are superior to those of non-curated model. In the non-curated marketing mode, resale is the optimal decision of the manufacturer, and only the agent can achieve the optimal profit of the livestream retailer. The manufacturer’s optimal decision damages the profit of the livestreaming retailer and causes interest conflict, while in the curated marketing mode, the conflict of interest can only be caused within a certain threshold. The cost-sharing contract can coordinate part of the conflict of interest caused by the manufacturer’s decision, which not only enables the manufacturer and the live streaming retailer to achieve a win-win situation, but also enables the decision of both sides to reach an agreement.

Key words:

sales model, livestreaming marketing method, Hotelling model, cost-sharing contract, supply chain decision-making

摘要：

制造商引入直播渠道有转售和代售两种模式选择，直播零售商也有非甄选与甄选两种直播营销方式选择，两者为自身利润最大化作出决策时，利益冲突不可避免。针对销售模式(转售/代售)与直播营销方式(非甄选/甄选)结合时如何进行最优决策和协调问题，建立由制造商、直播零售商组成的两级博弈模型，比较制造商不同销售模式和直播零售商不同营销方式选择的直播供应链成员最优决策，并设计直播供应链成员协调契约。研究发现：无论制造商选择转售还是代售模式，产品相似度小于一定阈值，甄选直播是零售商的最优决策，甄选直播营销方式下的零售价格、市场需求、直播供应链成员和整体利润都优于非甄选直播营销方式；非甄选营销方式下，转售是制造商的最优决策，代售才能实现直播零售商的最优利润，制造商的最优决策损害了直播零售商的利润，造成利益冲突，而甄选营销方式下只有在某一阈值内才会造成利益冲突；成本分担契约能协调制造商决策所造成的部分利益冲突，不仅使制造商和直播零售商实现双赢，还使双方的决策达成一致。

关键词:

销售模式, 直播营销方式, Hotelling模型, 成本分担契约, 供应链决策