Abstract: In the face of downstream rival entry and potential technology spillover, a buyer may adopt an exclusivity strategy when upgrading the supplier’s production technology through investments. This paper explores how the exclusivity strategy affects downstream entry, and how the incumbent buyer develops such a strategy. First, it examines the impact of the exclusivity strategy on new rival entry and finds that the strategy can block the entry of an entrant buyer when both the investment cost and the penalty cost are low, provided that the supplier’s production cost is high. Then, it analyzes the effect of the exclusivity strategy on technology spillover. The results show that the strategy can prevent technology spillover when both the investment cost and the production cost are low. In other cases, the strategy only prevents technology spillover if the cost is low; otherwise, the supplier will offer new technology to the entrant buyer. This paper further explores how the incumbent buyer designs an exclusivity strategy based on the firm entry. When the production cost is low, regardless of whether the investment cost is high or low, the incumbent buyer should set a high penalty. However, if the investment cost is very high, the penalty should not be excessively high. Then the production cost is medium or high, if the investment cost is low (or high), the incumbent buyer should set a low or high (high) penalty. If the investment cost is very high, the penalty should be set high but not excessively high. Finally, this paper investigates how the incumbent buyer shapes an exclusivity strategy based on technology spillover. If the production cost is low, the incumbent buyer should set a low penalty if the investment cost is low, and a low or high penalty if the investment cost is large. If the investment cost is very high, the penalty should not be set excessively high. For a high production cost, the incumbent buyer should set a low (low or medium) penalty, if the investment cost is low (or high).

Key words:

firm entry, supplier improvement, technology investment, exclusivity strategy

摘要： 针对下游竞争企业的进入以及可能出现的技术溢出，采购商通过投资提升供应商技术时会实施排他性策略，探讨这种技术投资的排他性策略的影响及制定方法。首先，分析排他性策略对竞争企业进入的影响。结果表明：当供应商的生产成本较大，且现有采购商的投资成本和惩罚成本均较小时，排他性策略能够阻止竞争企业进入，否则该企业进入市场。其次，在竞争企业已进入市场的情形下，研究排他性策略对技术溢出的影响。研究发现：当生产成本和投资成本均较小时，排他性策略总能防止技术溢出；在其他情况下，只有当惩罚成本较小时，该策略才能发挥防止技术溢出的作用，否则供应商将为竞争企业使用新技术。进一步，研究现有采购商如何基于竞争企业进入制定合适的排他性策略。给定较小的生产成本，无论投资成本的大小，现有采购商均应设置较高的惩罚，但当投资成本非常大时，排他性惩罚不能设置太高。给定中等或较大的生产成本，如果投资成本较小（大），现有采购商应该设置较低或较高（较高）的排他性惩罚；如果投资成本非常大，现有采购商则设置较高的惩罚，但此时这种惩罚不能太高。最后，分析基于技术溢出的排他性策略制定。结果显示：给定较小的生产成本，如果投资成本较小（较大），应该设置较低（较低或较高）的惩罚；如果投资成本非常大，则不能设置太高的惩罚；给定较大的生产成本，在较小（较大）投资成本情况的下，应该设置较低（较低或中等）的惩罚。

关键词: 企业进入, 供应商改进, 技术投资, 排他性策略