Abstract: Faced with unbalanced medical resource distribution and varying patient choices preferences, this paper develops a queuing game model to analyze the behavior of two types of patient within a tertiary-community hospital medical consortium. It compares doctor-sharing and bed-sharing strategies under two organizational structures, subordination and subcontracting, to explore the optimal resource-sharing strategy and consortium configuration under medical resource constraints. The findings provide new operational ideas and management insights for improving collaboration and resource integration among medical consortiums in China. Specifically, the doctor-sharing strategy is more effective in reducing patient travel costs and alleviating resource imbalances between hospitals, especially when either doctors or beds are in short supply. When doctors are relatively abundant, bed-sharing strategy allows for higher patient admissions, provided there is only a slight shortage of beds. Additionally, resource allocation is more efficient under the subordination model, while subcontracting performs comparably under specific conditions involving resources levels and competitive dynamics. This paper provides theoretical support for optimizing the structure and resource allocation mechanisms within China’s healthcare consortiums.

Key words: medical consortium, medical resource sharing, sharing mode, patient preference

摘要： 面对医疗资源不均衡及患者就医行为差异，为科学构建三甲-社区医院医联体，通过建立排队博弈模型，刻画了重症和轻症患者的就医选择行为。在紧密型和松散型医联体结构下，对比共享医生和共享病床两种模式，探讨不同医疗资源约束下的最优资源共享模式与医联体结构，为医联体协作提供运营思路与管理启示，助力我国医联体资源整合与结构搭建。研究发现,当三甲医院医生资源或病床资源严重短缺时,共享医生模式可降低患者就医路程成本，缓解医疗资源不平衡;当病床资源略显不足而医生资源充足时,共享病床模式能减少资源浪费，让更多患者入院；紧密型医联体结构使资源得到更合理的调配,但在特定资源和竞争条件下，松散型医联体结构表现同样出色。

关键词: 医联体, 医疗资源共享, 共享模式, 就医选择