Abstract: Based on limited attention theory, this paper examines the significant impact of institutional investors’ attention diversion (referred to as distraction) on the major shareholders’ tunneling behavior in Chinese A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2007 to 2022. The findings reveal that institutional investors’ distraction significantly exacerbates the tunneling behavior of major shareholders. This effect increases under conditions of financial distress and decreases with greater media coverage. The mechanism underlying this relationship is that distraction reduces corporate governance and increases information asymmetry, thus leading to more tunneling behavior of major shareholders. Moreover, distraction intensifies the damage caused by major shareholders’ tunneling behavior to the value of companies, although this moderating effect appears with a time lag. Firms with a high degree of tax avoidance and elevated information processing cost should be more cautious about the exacerbating effect of institutional investors’ distraction. The findings provide important implications for regulatory authorities to formulate relevant policies and effectively alleviate the tunneling behavior of major shareholders in Chinese listed companies.

Key words: institutional investors’ distraction, tunneling, corporate governance, information asymmetry

摘要： 基于机构投资者“有限关注”的背景，以2007~2022年沪深交易所A股上市公司为研究对象，考察机构投资者在其投资组合面临外生极端收益冲击时产生的注意力分散（即“分心”）对上市公司大股东掏空行为的影响。研究发现：机构投资者“分心”显著加剧上市公司大股东掏空现象；媒体关注能作为互补的外部监督约束机制，缓解机构投资者“分心”对大股东掏空的影响，而财务困境带来的内部压力使大股东在机构投资者“分心”时更易采取掏空行为；机构投资者“分心”会降低未受关注上市公司的治理水平，增大其内外部信息不对称程度，进而导致大股东掏空行为增加；机构投资者“分心”会加剧大股东掏空行为对上市公司价值的损害，但这种调节作用具有滞后性；避税程度高及信息处理成本高的企业更应防范机构投资者“分心”对大股东掏空的加剧作用。研究结论为监管部门制定相关政策、缓解中国上市公司大股东掏空行为提供了参考。

关键词: 机构投资者“分心”, 大股东掏空, 公司治理, 信息不对称