Abstract: The booming development of internet technology has pushed e-commerce platforms to begin implementing marketing activities based on big data analysis, which expands the potential market demand and attracts entrant manufacturer to encroach online market through the platform. This paper constructs a game-theoretical model for a supply chain consisting of an incumbent manufacturer, an entrant manufacturer, and a platform when the platform adopts the data-driven marketing activity, specifically considering three models according to choices of the entrant manufacturer: no encroachment, reselling encroachment, and agency selling encroachment. It explores the optimal encroachment strategy from the perspectives of entrant manufacturer and platform by analyzing the equilibrium solutions. The results show that both reselling encroachment and agency selling encroachment may be the optimal strategy. When data-driven marketing cost is high, as commission rate increases, the optimal encroachment strategy will change alternately along the path of “reselling→agency selling→reselling”, which always damages the platform’s profit but increases the entrant manufacturer’s profit. Counter-intuitively, under agency selling encroachment, the entrant manufacturer’s profit positively correlates with the commission rate when the data-driven marketing cost is low. Under certain conditions, entrant manufacturer reselling (agency selling) encroachment can increase incumbent manufacturer’s profit and realize Pareto improvement, which is in contrast to the findings of previous studies. Finally. it conducts three extended studies and verifies the robustness of the main results regarding the optimal encroachment strategy.

Key words: market encroachment, data-driven marketing, agency selling, reselling

摘要： 随着互联网技术的发展，电商平台基于大数据分析的营销活动日益普及，不仅扩大了产品潜在市场需求，也促使制造商通过与电商平台合作入侵在线市场。本文针对由在位制造商、进入制造商和电商平台构成的供应链系统，分别构建进入制造商不入侵、转售模式入侵和代理模式入侵3种策略下的博弈模型，并从进入制造商和平台双方视角探讨了最优入侵策略。研究发现：转售模式和代理模式均可能成为最优入侵策略；当数据驱动营销成本处于中高水平时，随着佣金率提高，最优入侵策略呈现“转售→代理→转售”交替变化，这一变化总会降低平台利润，但会使进入制造商利润产生向上跳跃；与直觉相悖，在代理模式入侵下，当数据驱动营销成本较低时，进入制造商利润与佣金率正相关；在一定条件下，进入制造商通过转售（代理）模式入侵可以提升在位制造商利润，实现供应链成员利润的帕累托改进，该结论与以往研究有所不同；最后通过3项拓展研究验证了最优入侵策略的稳健性。

关键词: 市场入侵, 数据驱动营销, 代理销售, 转售