Abstract: A supplier may provide guarantee for a retailer to get the bank loan. A Stackelberg game-theoretic model is presented to capture the interaction between a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer under the CVaR criterion. The supplier’s expected profit and the retailer’s order quantity at equilibrium are demonstrated to be decreasing in the retailer’s internal capital and the degree of the retailer’s risk-aversion. By providing guarantee, the supplier can improve both his expected profit and the efficiency of the supply chain. Numerical examples show that the supplier’s guarantee is beneficial to the retailer only if the retailer’s internal capital is higher than a threshold value. Finally, the model is extended to consider the supplier’s risk-aversion. It is found that the supplier prefers not to provide guarantee as his risk-aversion increases to a threshold level.

Key words: capital constraint, newsvendor, risk-aversion, supplier-guaranteed loan

摘要： 当零售商缺乏足够的资金用于订货时，可在供应商的担保下向银行借款。供应商和零售商在批发价格合约的框架下进行Stackelberg博弈。供应商是风险中性的，零售商是风险厌恶的，按照条件风险值(CVaR)准则进行决策。研究表明：随着零售商自有资金及其风险厌恶程度的增大，均衡的订货量和供应商的期望利润会降低，供应链的总期望利润也会降低。相比于无担保贷款的情形，供应商提供担保可以提高自身和供应链的期望利润。数值例子表明，当零售商的自有资金较小时，供应商的担保不利于零售商；反之，供应商的担保可提高零售商的绩效。最后，将模型扩展至供应商为风险厌恶的情形，发现当供应商的风险厌恶程度超过一定的临界值时，供应商不提供担保会取得更好的绩效。

关键词: 资金约束, 报童, 风险厌恶, 供应商担保