Abstract:

Total carbon emissions throughout the life cycle of buildings are enormous. Adopting green buildings and improving their green degree are important means to realize carbon neutrality, subsidy policies and procurement mechanisms being the key factors affecting their designed and operational green degree. Taking this into consideration, when the government subsidizes the buyer or bidder, this paper introduces the reward and punishment mechanism into the procurement auctions to study the design of the aforementioned factors. The results indicate that whether the subsidy object is the buyer or the bidder, the mechanism has different effects on the designed green degree by various bidders. Only the bidder’s designed green degree is more effective, and increasing the reward and punishment intensity can encourage the bidder to improve the designed green degree. When the subsidy object is the buyer, increasing the subsidy intensity of design can improve the designed green degree, but increasing the subsidy intensity of operation does not improve the designed green degree. When the subsidy object is the bidder, increasing the subsidy intensity of design or operation can improve the designed green degree. Compared to subsidizing the buyer, subsidizing the bidder effectively encourages the bidder to improve the designed and operational green degree and its achievement level. The study reflects the effectiveness of procurement auctions with a reward and punishment mechanism, suggesting that governments should subsidize bidders as opposed to subsidizing buyers.

Key words: green building, green degree, subsidy policy, reward and punishment mechanism, multi-attribute procurement auctions

摘要：

建筑全过程碳排放总量巨大，采用绿色建筑并提高其绿色度是实现碳中和的重要手段，政府的补贴政策、招标商的采购方式是影响绿色建筑的设计绿色度和运行绿色度的关键因素。鉴于此，分别在政府补贴招标商或投标商时，将奖惩机制引入采购拍卖，研究补贴政策和采购方式的设计问题。研究发现，无论补贴对象是招标商还是投标商，奖惩机制对不同类型投标商承诺的最优设计绿色度产生了不同的影响，只有投标商的设计绿色度有效性较高，增加奖惩强度才能提高最优设计绿色度。当补贴对象为招标商时，增加设计补贴强度能够激励投标商提高最优设计绿色度，但增加运行补贴强度不能激励投标商提高最优设计绿色度。当补贴对象为投标商时，设计补贴强度和运行补贴强度的增加均能激励投标商提高最优设计绿色度。相对于补贴招标商，补贴投标商能够有效地激励投标商提高最优设计绿色度、最优运行绿色度和绿色度达成水平。研究结论反映了带奖惩机制的采购拍卖方式的有效性，表明了相对于补贴招标商，政府更应该补贴投标商。

关键词: 绿色建筑, 绿色度, 补贴政策, 奖惩机制, 多属性采购拍卖