Abstract:

In a secondary supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a supplier, the supplier’s financial constraints and private information about their production effort costs significantly influence the manufacturer’s procurement strategy. To delve into this dynamic, the Stackelberg game model constructed under the buyer-direct financing (BDF) mode uniquely integrates the concepts of supply chain finance and information asymmetry, presenting distinctiveness characteristics compared to existing literature. Scenarios of both information symmetry and asymmetry are encompassed, with a focus on analyzing how the manufacturer formulate optimal procurement contracts under conditions of information asymmetry. In addition, how the type and precision of information acquired by the manufacturer impact the decisions and benefits of all parties in the supply chain is further explored. It is revealed that the supplier’s asset collateral value, the type of information obtained, and the precision of information significantly influence the manufacturer’s decisions on procurement prices and loan interest rates. In situations of information asymmetry, different types of information have varying effects on the tradable range. When the manufacturer acquires information for free, increasing information precision aids the manufacturer in making more rational decisions, thereby achieving higher expected profits, especially when facing information disadvantages. However, when the manufacturer incurs costs to obtain information, the optimal information precision for maximizing profits is not always higher but is constrained by the costs of information acquisition.

Key words:

buyer direct financing, information asymmetry, Stackelberg game, information accuracy rate

摘要：

在由单个制造商和供应商构成的二级供应链中，供应商的资金限制以及私有的生产努力成本信息显著影响制造商的采购策略。为深入探索这一动态，所构建的买方直接融资模式下的斯塔克伯格博弈模型结合了供应链金融和信息不对称的概念，与现有文献相比呈现出独特性。研究涉及信息对称和不对称两种场景，着重分析了制造商在信息不对称条件下如何制定最优采购合约，同时深入探讨了制造商获取信息的类型和精度如何影响供应链各方的决策与收益。研究发现，供应商的资产抵押物价值、获得的信息类型和信息的精确程度都在很大程度上影响制造商的采购价格和贷款利率决策。在信息不对称情况下，不同类型的信息对可交易范围产生差异效应。当制造商免费获得信息时，提高信息精度率有助于信息劣势下的制造商做出更合理的决策，从而实现更高的预期利润。然而，当制造商需要支付获取信息的成本时，实现利润最大化的最佳信息精度率并非总是越高越好，而是受到信息获取成本的制约。

关键词:

买方直接融资, 信息不对称, 斯塔克伯格博弈, 信息精度率