Abstract: In the era of digital intelligence economy, aggregating user data of different dimensions can be of great value. Based on the complementary purchase behavior of data users, this paper constructs a two-stage game model of data disclosure and data transaction to investigate the disclosure price of data owners and the transaction price of data brokers. The result shows that when brokers do not obtain data, the degree of complementarity between transaction price and data value presents a nonlinear relationship. Compared with brokers who do not obtain data, when a broker obtains data, if the data value is highly complementary, the transaction price of the broker who obtains the data increases, and the transaction price of the broker who does not obtain the data remains unchanged. If the degree of data value complementarity is low, the transaction price of brokers who obtain data increases but that of brokers who do not obtain data decreases. Compared with brokers who do not obtain data, when brokers obtain data, the transaction price remains unchanged. It is generally believed that the data is non-exclusive and non-competitive, which will promote the multiple sales behavior of the data owner. However, this paper finds that under a certain degree of data value complementarity, the data owner will set the optimal disclosure price and disclose the data to only one data broker.

Key words: value complementarity, disclosure price, acquisition strategy, transaction price

摘要： 数智经济时代，聚合不同维度的用户数据能够发掘出巨大价值。基于数据使用者互补性购买行为，构建数据披露与数据交易的两阶段博弈模型，考察数据拥有者的披露价格（获取价格）与数据经纪商的交易价格。结论显示：当经纪商都不获取数据时，最优交易价格与数据价值互补性程度呈现非线性关系。相比经纪商都不获取数据，当有一个经纪商获取数据时，如果数据价值互补性程度较高，获取数据的经纪商最优交易价格上升，没有获取数据的经纪商最优交易价格不变；如果数据价值互补性程度较低，获取数据的经纪商最优交易价格上升，没有获取数据的经纪商最优交易价格下降。相比经纪商都不获取数据，当经纪商都获取数据时，最优交易价格保持不变。通常认为，数据存在非排他性与非竞争性，会促使数据拥有者的多重销售行为。然而，本文发现，在一定的数据价值互补性程度下，数据拥有者制定最优披露价格，将只向一个数据经纪商披露数据。

关键词: 价值互补性, 披露价格, 获取策略, 交易价格