Journal of Systems & Management ›› 2022, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (2): 302-316.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1005-2542.2022.02.008
Previous Articles Next Articles
ZHANG Jianhu1,LI Changying1,XIE Shenxiang2
Online:
Published:
张剑虎1,李长英1,谢申详2
作者简介:
基金资助:
Abstract: This paper studies the entry, competition, and regulation of platform enterprises in the case of targeted advertising by using the Salop (1979) model. It is found that when the advertising orientation accuracy is low (high), the equilibrium advertising volume is inversely (positively) proportional to the advertising orientation accuracy of the platform. Compared to the social optimum, equilibrium advertising is excessive (inadequate) when the advertising orientation accuracy is low (high). Free entry may lead to too many or too few platforms, depending on the degree of product differentiation and the advertising orientation accuracy. When the government solely controls the entry of platforms, the number of platforms is socially excessive (deficient) when the advertising orientation accuracy is low (high) compared with the social optimization. When the government solely regulates the advertising volume, the advertising volume can be too high or too low, depending on the degree of product differentiation and the advertising orientation accuracy.
Key words: platform, targeted advertising, free entry, government regulation
摘要: 基于经典的Salop模型,研究了定向广告情况下平台企业的进入、竞争与规制问题。研究发现:当广告定向精度较小(大)时,均衡广告量与平台的广告定向精度成反(正)比;与社会最优状态相比,当广告 定向精度较小(大)时,均衡的广告量过多(少),而均衡平台数量是否过多既取决于平台的差异化程度,又取 决于平台的广告定向精度;如果政府只管控平台数量,那么,相对于社会最优而言,当广告定向精度较小(大) 时,平台的数量过多(少);如果政瘠只管控广告量,广告量既可能大于也可能小于社会最优的广告量,最终結 果取决于平台的差异化程度及其广告定向精度。
关键词: 平台, 定向广告, 自由进入, 政府规制
CLC Number:
F 49
ZHANG Jianhu, LI Changying, XIE Shenxiang. Entry,Competition,and Regulation of Platform Enterprises[J]. Journal of Systems & Management, 2022, 31(2): 302-316.
张剑虎, 李长英, 谢申详. 平台企业的进入、竞争与规制[J]. 系统管理学报, 2022, 31(2): 302-316.
0 / Recommend
Add to citation manager EndNote|Ris|BibTeX
URL: https://xtglxb.sjtu.edu.cn/EN/10.3969/j.issn.1005-2542.2022.02.008
https://xtglxb.sjtu.edu.cn/EN/Y2022/V31/I2/302
Three-Party Evolutionary Game Analysis of New Retail Platform, Deliverymen, and Consumer Considering Delivery Traffic Risk
Price Decision of Platform Enterprises Based on Consumer's Purchase History
Online Product Pricing Strategies Considering Customer Switching Behavior
Research on Quality Supervision Mechanism of Third-Party E-Commerce Platform in Information Asymmetry Based on Two-Sided Markets Theory