Abstract: Retailers' overconfidence on market demand is mainly reflected in two aspects: over-expectation of market demand and overestimation of market demand forecast accuracy, which will lead to deviations in their operational decisions compared with decisions when they are completely rational. This paper studies the optimal ordering decision problem of overconfident retailer by constructing a cognitive model reflecting two kinds of overconfidence, which improves the cognitive model that normally considers the overconfidence in the accuracy of market demand prediction in related existing research. Based on the improved model, it obtains the optimal ordering decision for overconfident retailer with no capital constraints and with capital constraints alleviated by bank financing. The results show that the overconfident retailer’s optimal order quantity is larger than that of a rational one when he has sufficient fund and the expected market demand is relatively high. However, the optimal expected profit will be decreasing with retailer’s overconfidence preference. The conclusions will be opposite when the expected market demand is relatively small. The risk-averse bank’s loan decision is affected by the retailer’s initial capital level. The capital-constrained retailer’s optimal order quantity is related to his overconfidence preference, interest rate as well as his initial capital level.

Key words: overconfidence, capital constrains, bank financing, ordering decision

摘要： 零售商对市场需求的过度自信主要体现在对市场需求期望过高和对市场需求的预测精度高估两个方面，这会导致其经营决策与完全理性时的决策相比有偏差。为此，构造了反映两种过度自信的市场需求认知模型，改进了现有相关研究中往往仅考虑对市场需求的预测精度高估的市场需求认知模型，并基于改进的需求认知模型得到了过度自信零售商在无资金约束和存在资金约束且由银行提供融资服务时的最优订购决策。研究表明：如果市场需求的期望值较大，则存在过度自信的无资金约束零售商的最优订购量大于完全理性下的订购量，但其最优的期望利润随着过度自信水平的增大反而减少；如果市场需求的期望值相对较小，则结论刚好相反。当零售商面临资金约束时，风险规避银行是否提供融资服务取决于零售商的自有资金水平；过度自信零售商的最优订购决策不仅受自身自信水平的影响，还受银行融资利率和初始自有资金水平的影响。

关键词: 过度自信, 资金约束, 银行融资, 订购决策