Abstract: In the era of big data, many foreign-funded enterprises and local enterprises have the technical capacity to collect and make use of the personal information of consumers. A duopoly game model is established to describe the fact that both foreign-funded enterprises and local enterprises may make personalized pricing based on consumer personal information they collected, and to investigate the impact of personal information protection on the competition between local enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises and its welfare effects. The results show that consumer surplus falls into the lowest when information collection is forbidden for all enterprises, and consumer surplus reaches the highest when there is no information protection. Enterprise that unilaterally collects consumer personal information will obtain the highest profit, but social welfare is the worst if the foreign enterprise unilaterally collects information, and it reaches the best if the local enterprise unilaterally collects information. Industry self-regulation can become a means to protect personal information only if violation of self-regulation agreements have to confront with certain punishments, but, industry self-regulation will lead to an inefficient equilibrium. This research may provide some reference for government departments to formulate consumer personal information protection policies and to regulate multinational enterprises on collecting and using personal information.

Key words: personal information protection, price discrimination, foreign-funded enterprises, local enterprises, welfare analysis

摘要： 大数据时代，不少外资企业和本土企业具有收集和利用消费者个人信息的技术能力。构建了双寡头博弈模型，刻画了外资企业和本土企业都可能基于消费者个人信息进行个性化定价的事实，研究个人信息保护对于本土企业和外资企业竞争的影响及其福利效应。结果表明：对所有企业都采取保护时消费者剩余最小，无保护时消费者剩余最大；单方面获得消费者个人信息的企业将获得最高利润，但是当外资企业单方面获得信息时社会福利最小，当本土企业单方面获得信息时社会福利最大。研究还发现，如果违反行业自律协议将面临一定的惩罚时，行业自律能够成为一种保护个人信息的手段，但行业自律将带来无效的均衡。研究结果对政府管理部门制定消费者个人信息保护政策，对跨国企业收集和利用本国个人信息的规制提供了一定的借鉴。

关键词: 个人信息保护, 价格歧视, 外资企业, 本土企业, 福利分析