Abstract:

Considering the retailer’s dual-channel supply chain where the supplier holds his vertical shares, the influences of supplier’s shareholding ratio and retailer’s online channel ratio were analyzed on supply chain members and system about some decisions, such as pricing in a supplier-led Stackelberg game based on centralized decision-making. The results indicate that in the dual-channel supply chain of the retailer, increasing the shareholding ratio of the supplier can further promote the demand of each channel and improve the total profit of the supplier and supply chain, but it will damage the retailer’s profit. The retailer’s market share of online channel has a positive impact on its price and sales volume. In contrast, the market share of traditional channel has the opposite effect. Finally, a two-part pricing contract was designed to coordinate the supply chain, and both the corresponding wholesale price range and transfer payment range were given, which was proved to be able to achieve flexible distribution of the total profits of the supply chain.

Key words: supplier’s vertical shareholding, retailer’s dual channel, shareholding ratio, two-part pricing

摘要：

考虑供应商纵向持股的零售商双渠道供应链，以集中决策为基准，分析了供应商主导的Stackelberg博弈中供应商持股比例和零售商网络渠道所占比例对供应链成员及系统定价等相关决策的影响。研究结果表明：在零售商双渠道供应链中，提高供应商持股比例，能进一步促进各渠道需求并增加供应商和供应链总利润，但会损害零售商利益；零售商网络渠道所占比例与网络渠道价格和销量呈正相关关系，传统渠道所占比例则与之相反。最后，通过设计二部定价契约来协调该供应链，给出相应的批发价格和转移支付范围，证明了该契约可以实现对供应链总利润的灵活分配。

关键词: 供应商纵向持股, 零售商双渠道, 持股比例, 二部定价