Abstract:

The globalization of digital economy and the networking of consumption have promoted the innovation of auction mechanisms. In view of the seller’s “impulse” to over set a buyout price, this paper constructs an online buyout price auction mechanism combining commissions and penalties based on the complementary characteristics of commissions and buy-in penalties. It uses the static game theory for recursive analysis. First, it investigates bidders’ optimal bidding strategies on the base of Nash equilibrium. Then, it analyzes the seller’s pricing decision of the buyout price and the setting of commission rate for the auction platform and buy-in penalties for the whole system. Finally, it verifies the superiority of the auction mechanism through a numerical experiment. The results indicate that there exist a bidders’ optimal symmetric equilibrium, a sellers’ optimal buyout price, and a reserve price strategy, as well as an optimal commission rate of auction platform and an optimal buy-in penalty that maximizes the expected revenue of the whole system. Compared with the buyout price auction setting without buy-in penalties, the reserve price and buyout price set by the seller are relatively low, which not only increases the opportunity for bidders to participate in the auction and reduces the probability of auction failure, but also promotes bidders to choose the buyout price, thus increasing the probability of a buyout price being executed and increasing bidders’ expected revenue. The proposed mechanism satisfies conditions of incentive compatibility and individual rationality, which is beneficial to the seller to set a reasonable buyout price and increase the probability of a successful auction.

Key words:

commission rate, buy-in penalties, buyout price, mechanism design

摘要：

数字经济全球化和消费网络化推动了拍卖机制的创新。针对网上一口价拍卖机制中卖方存在过高设置一口价的“冲动”，利用佣金与罚金具有互补性的特点，构建了佣金与罚金相结合的网上一口价拍卖机制。运用静态博弈理论进行递归分析，首先通过纳什均衡确定了竞拍者的最优报价策略，然后分析了卖方的价格决策、拍卖平台和系统分别对佣金率及罚金的设置问题，最后通过数值算例验证了该拍卖机制的优越性。研究表明：存在竞拍者最优对称均衡报价和卖方最优一口价与保留价策略，以及拍卖平台的最优佣金率和使系统期望收益最大化的最优罚金；与无罚金的一口价拍卖相比，卖方设置的保留价和一口价相对较低，不仅增加了竞拍者参与拍卖的机会，降低了流拍概率，还促进了竞拍者选择一口价，从而使一口价被执行的概率增加，同时提高了竞拍者的期望收益。所提出的机制满足激励相容和个体理性，有利于卖方设置合理的一口价，提高商品成功拍卖的概率。

关键词:

佣金率, 流拍罚金, 一口价, 机制设计