Abstract: In a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, this paper examines two financing models for a financially constrained manufacturer: financing from a bank or financing from the retailer. Using a Stackelberg game framework and backward induction, it develops and analyzes the models. Under the condition that the retailer undertakes both pre-sales and after-sales services, it compares two financing strategies to determine the manufacturer’s optimal choice. The results show that under certain conditions, financing from the retailer is not always the best option for the manufacturer. For the manufacturer, the retailer, and the total supply chain as a whole, when the retailer offers a relatively low interest rate, financing from the retailer becomes the manufacturer’s optimal strategy. However, when the bank’s interest rate exceeds a certain threshold, the manufacturer may prefer to finance from the bank instead.

Key words: pre-sales and after-sales services, capital constraints, supply chain management, financing decisions

摘要： 本文研究由一个制造商与一个零售商构成的供应链。在制造商面临资金短缺的情况下，分别构其向银行融资和向零售商融资两种模型，基于Stackelberg博弈理论，采用逆向归纳法对模型进行建立与求解。在零售商同时承担售前与售后服务的前提下，比较两种融资策略的绩效，进而得出制造商的最优融资策略。研究结果表明：制造商向零售商融资并非最优选择。对制造商、零售商能乃至整体供应链而言，当零售商设定的贷款利率较低时，向零售商融资是制造商的最优选择；而当银行的贷款利率高于某一阈值时，制造商则可能倾向于选择向银行融资。

关键词: 售前和售后服务, 资金约束, 供应链管理, 融资决策