Journal of Systems & Management ›› 2026, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (1): 57-71.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.2097-4558.2026.01.005

Previous Articles     Next Articles

Blockchain Technology Adoption Strategy Considering Consumer Privacy Concerns in Dual-Channel Competition

GAO Peng1, NIE Jiajia2, ZHU Binxin3, ZHAO Liuwei1   

  1. 1. School of Management, Jiangsu University of Technology, Changzhou 213001, Jiangsu, China; 2. School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China; 3. School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, Jiangsu, China
  • Received:2023-09-13 Revised:2023-11-14 Online:2026-01-28 Published:2026-02-12

双渠道竞争下考虑消费者隐私关注的区块链技术采用策略

高鹏1,聂佳佳2,朱宾欣3,赵刘威1   

  1. 1.江苏理工学院 管理学院,江苏 常州 213001;2.西南交通大学 经济管理学院,成都 610031;3.江苏大学 管理学院,江苏 镇江 212013
  • 基金资助:
    江苏省社会科学基金资助项目(24GLB015,22GLD017);江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学研究重大项目(2023SJZD024)

Abstract: To address the decline in consumer trust caused by product information opacity, this paper introduces the blockchain technology into a competitive dual-channel direct-selling supply chain, considering both the trust-enhancing effect of blockchain and consumers’ concerns over privacy leakage. By comparing the optimal pricing and profit under four adoption scenarios: neither channel adopts blockchain (NN), only the offline channel adopts (BN), only the online channel adopts (NB), and both channels adopt (BB), it explores in detail equilibrium adoption strategies for blockchain in dual-channel settings and further examines the influence of blockchain adoption on offline channel service levels. The results show that regardless of which channel adopts blockchain, an increase in consumer privacy concern costs lead to a decrease in the channel’s product prices and profits. Moreover, the incentive for either channel to adopt blockchain weakens as the initial product trust level increases. When both consumer privacy concern costs and initial product trust are low, the equilibrium strategy is for both channels to adopt blockchain (BB), When both are high, the equilibrium strategy is for neither to adopt (NN). When both are at moderate levels, the equilibrium strategy is for the offline channel to adopt while the online channel does not (BN). Regarding service levels, under the BN and BB scenarios, offline channel service levels decline as consumer privacy concern costs increase; in contrast, under the NB scenario, the offline service level rises with increasing privacy concern costs.

Key words: dual-channel competition, blockchain technology, consumer privacy concerns, supply chain management

摘要: 为应对产品信息不透明所引发的消费者信任下降问题,本研究将区块链技术引入一个竞争性的线上线下双渠道直销供应链中,同时考虑区块链技术带来的消费者产品信任度提升效应,以及消费者对隐私信息泄露的关注。通过对比分析双渠道均不采用区块链(NN)、线下采用在线不采用(BN)、在线采用线下不采用(NB)以及双渠道均采用(BB)这4种模式下的最优定价与利润,探讨了双渠道的区块链技术采纳均衡策略,并进一步分析了区块链采用对线下渠道服务水平的影响。研究发现:无论哪一个渠道采用区块链,消费者隐私关注成本的提高都会导致该渠道的产品价格和利润下降。此外,渠道双方采纳区块链的动机会随原有产品信任度的提升而减弱。当消费者的隐私关注成本与原有产品信任程度均较低时,均衡策略为双渠道均采用区块链(BB);当二者均较高时,均衡策略为均不采用(NN);而当二者处于中等水平时,均衡策略为线下采用而在线不采用(BN)。在服务水平方面,BN 与 BB模式下的线下渠道服务水平随着消费者隐私关注成本的增大而下降;而在 NB模式下,结论则相反。

关键词: 双渠道竞争, 区块链技术, 消费者隐私关注, 供应链管理

CLC Number: