Abstract: The gradual nature of green transformation in the manufacturing sector means the coexistence and competition of green and non-green products in the market over the long term. Due to the unique environmental attributes of green products, an asymmetric substitution relationship arises between the two, directly affecting the incentives and strategic choices of government subsidy policies. This paper explores the game between green and non-green manufacturers and their dominant retailers under three scenarios: no government subsidy, lump-sum subsidy, and per-unit subsidy, and analyzes the factors affecting subsidy effectiveness and strategy selection. It is found that both subsidy strategies can improve product greenness, promote green consumption, and increase retailer profit, with green manufacturer profits and subsidy coefficients exhibiting a positive U-shaped and inverse U-shaped relationship, respectively. Intensified competition between green and non-green products can raise prices, but through market expansion or enhanced premium capability, all supply chain members can benefit. When competition is sufficiently intense and per-unit subsidies are high, green product prices may fall below levels under no subsidy. Given the same total subsidy expenditure, lump-sum subsidies can better motivate overall green transformation and development of the supply chain, whereas per-unit subsidies can better strengthen government performance across multi-dimensions, including corporate profits, consumer surplus, and environmental improvement. When both subsidy intensity and the marginal return on environmental improvement are high, the government tends to adopt per-unit subsidies to achieve multi-dimensional objectives, although the asymmetric substitution between the two products can weaken this motivation. If cost differences between the two product types are large, the government is more likely to use lump-sum subsidies to ensure policy effectiveness. Reducing green costs or enhancing consumer green preferences helps green products capture market share from non-green products. This clarifies the principles and conditions under which different subsidy policies influence supply chain green transformation, providing micro-decision-making insights for enterprises and theoretical basis for the government policy aimed at promoting the green transformation and development of enterprises.

Key words: supply chain competition, asymmetric substitution, lump-sum subsidy, per-unit subsidy, retailer-led

摘要： 制造业绿色转型的渐进性决定了绿色与非绿色产品在市场中长期共存并相互竞争。由于绿色产品具有独特的环保属性，二者之间形成了非对称的替代关系，直接影响政府补贴政策的激励效果与策略选择。本文探讨了在无政府补贴、一次性补贴与单位补贴3种情形下，绿色与非绿色制造商及其主导型零售商之间的博弈，分析补贴效果及其策略选择的影响因素。研究表明：首先，两种补贴均能提升产品绿色水平、促进绿色消费并提高零售商利润；其中，绿色制造商利润与补贴系数分别呈正U型与倒U型关系。其次，两类产品间竞争加剧虽会推高产品价格，但通过扩大市场或提升溢价能力，能使所有供应链成员获益。当竞争足够激烈且单位补贴力度较大时，绿色产品价格可能低于无补贴情形。再次，补贴总支出相同的情况下，一次性补贴更能激励供应链整体转型，而单位补贴则更有利于提升包含企业利润、消费者剩余与环境效益在内的政府绩效；当补贴力度与环境改善的边际收益率均较高时，政府倾向于采用单位补贴以实现多维目标，但产品间的非对称替代关系会削弱此动机；若两类产品成本差异过大，政府则更可能采用一次性补贴的方式以保证政策效用。最后，降低绿色成本或增强消费者绿色偏好，有助于绿色产品夺取非绿色产品的市场份额。本研究揭示了不同补贴政策影响供应链绿色转型的原理与条件，为政府补贴下企业的微观决策提供了参考，也为政府推动企业绿色转型与发展的政策制定提供了理论依据。

关键词: 供应链竞争, 不对称替代, 一次性补贴, 单位补贴, 零售商主导