Abstract: This paper examines a supply chain system composed of a manufacturer, an offline retailer, and an e-commerce platform. It develops a game-theoretic model under two online sales modes, resale and agency, and two scenarios of whether the e-commerce platform shares information, to explore how information-sharing strategies affect the manufacturer’s selection of online sales mode. The results indicate that the existence of an offline retailer can increase the manufacturer’s profit and influence its sales mode. When demand volatility is low (high), the manufacturer tends to adopt the agency (resale) mode. For moderate demand volatility, the platform’s information-sharing behavior can alter the manufacturer’s mode selection. When product substitutability is high, information sharing enables the manufacturer to select agency mode, achieving a triple-win situation for the manufacturer, offline retailer, and e-commerce platform. A shift from resale to agency mode by the manufacturer may also lead to Pareto improvement for the platform. Moreover, cost considerations affect the e-commerce platform’s information sharing decision, which in turn influences the manufacturer’s mode selection.

Key words: sales mode, information sharing, demand volatility, commission rate

摘要： 考虑由一个制造商、一个线下零售商和一个电商平台组成的供应链系统。本文基于转售模式与代理模式，针对电商平台是否共享信息两种情形构建博弈模型，旨在探究不同信息共享策略下制造商的线上销售模式选择问题。研究结果表明：线下零售商的存在能够提高制造商的利润，并改变制造商的销售模式。当需求波动性较低时，制造商倾向于选择代理模式；当需求波动性较高时，则倾向于选择转售模式；而当需求波动性处于中等水平时，电商平台的信息共享行为将改变制造商的模式选择。当产品间替代程度较高时，在信息共享条件下，制造商选择代理模式可以实现制造商、线下零售商与电商平台的三方共赢。制造商由转售模式转向代理模式，可能促使电商平台实现帕累托改进。此外，成本因素也会影响电商平台的信息共享决策，进而影响制造商的销售模式选择。

关键词: 销售模式, 信息共享, 需求波动性, 佣金率