|
Interactive Effort, Interrelated Performance Measures Index, and the Choice of Optimal Incentives: The Models and Analysis based on the Principal-Agent Theory
2015, 24 (5):
690-699.
doi: F 062.5
Performance management is a very important in enterprise management. Performance appraisal can be achieved by various departments within the enterprise management, and the reasonable selection of performance indicators is the foundation and basis in designing agency contract. We include interrelated performance measures and interactive effort into the project of the optimal incentive contract, employing the comparative static analysis method to study how interrelated performance measures and interactive effort affect the choice of optimal incentives. The study indicates that both performance measures and managerial tasks interact with each other. The incremental information that the various performance measures has brought about depends on the agent's tasks (i.e., substitute or complementary). Moreover, we find that under certain conditions increases in performance measure interrelations translates into increased profits. If the task is mutual substitutable, the impact on the level of profits depends on the relative variance between indicators. Based on this, we put forward some policy suggestions. For example, when the principal designs the incentive contract, he or she should include non-financial indicators, and analyze both various interrelated performance measures and interactive effort. Meanwhile, attention should be paid to how to use the comprehensive performance measures and disaggregate performance measures.
References |
Related Articles
|