关键词: 供应链协调, 博弈分析, 射频识别技术, 库存损耗, 机制设计

Abstract: This paper considers a supply chain composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. Before investing in radio frequency identification (RFID) technology, the retailer faces inventory shrinkage issues, and the two parties transact under a wholesale price contract. After investing in RFID technology, the retailer shares part of the sales revenue with the manufacturer. It is found that introducing only a revenue-sharing mechanism increases the manufacturer’s profit but reduces the retailer’s profit. Therefore, three coordination mechanisms are further explored: revenue sharing with negotiated wholesale prices, revenue sharing with negotiated wholesale prices and order quantities, and negotiated wholesale prices with revenue-sharing ratios. The objective is to identify conditions under which revenue-sharing mechanisms can simultaneously improve profits for both parties, analyze preferences for different coordination mechanisms, and determine when both parties benefit from RFID investment. This paper also compares investment incentives under different mechanisms. It obtains several new conclusions, offering insights into motivating supply chain members to adopt item-level RFID technology and enriching supply chain coordination theory.

Key words: supply chain coordination, game theory, radio frequency identification (RFID) technology, inventory shrinkage, mechanism design