Abstract: The problem of global desertification is becoming increasingly serious. Governments all over the world have fully realized the importance of desert governance. However, desert governance needs a lot of funds, advanced technology, and a long governance cycle. It is impossible to effectively control deserts only by government investment. Therefore, social capital should be fully utilized. By constructing a differential game model between the government and the enterprise, the use of subsidies and tax rate regulation by the government to guide social capital to effectively control the desert is studied. The results show that the reduction of the tax rate of original industries of enterprises or the reduction of the tax rate of green industries after the enterprises have participated in desert governance can promote enterprises to increase their investment in desert governance, and the greater the influence coefficient of desert governance on enterprises’ goodwill is, the more effective the governments’ strategy of reducing the original industrial tax rate of enterprises to promote enterprises to increase their investment in desert governance is. The government can improve the effect of government subsidies on investment in desert governance by reducing the two kinds of tax rates which have an interactive effect on the effect. The results of this paper can provide policy reference for the government to introduce social capital to effectively control the desert.

Key words: desert management, differential game, social capital, tax rate

摘要： 全球沙漠化问题日益严重，各国政府已经充分认识到沙漠治理的重要性，但沙漠治理需要大量资金、先进技术并且治理周期长，完全依靠政府投资无法有效治理沙漠，因此应充分利用社会资本。通过构建政府与企业间的微分博弈模型研究了政府如何利用补贴、税率调控引导社会资本能够有效治理沙漠。研究结果表明：政府降低企业原有产业的税率或降低企业沙漠治理后从事的绿色产业税率均可促进企业提高沙漠治理投入，且治理沙漠对企业商誉的影响系数越大，政府降低企业原有产业税率促进企业提高沙漠治理投入的策略越有效。政府分别降低两种税率均能够提高政府补贴水平对企业沙漠治理投入水平的影响效应，且两种税率对影响效应具有交互效应。研究结果为政府引入社会资本有效治理沙漠提供政策性决策参考。

关键词: 沙漠治理, 微分博弈, 社会资本, 税率