Abstract: Enterprise participation is very important for the success of public goods technological innovation. In the contract design, traditional factors cannot be ignored, and internal characteristics of agents and external environment also need to be considered. A dual agent model based on fairness was constructed to study the influence of subcontractors’ fairness on optimal contract and expected revenue of the public sector. The results show that the greater the difference in the strength of fairness preference between the two subcontractors, the more favorable it is to improve the expected utility of the public sector. However, two prerequisites must be met. First, the subcontractor with a higher level of ability has a stronger strength of fairness. Second, the public sector must redesign the size and combination of incentive coefficients based on fairness and random dependence so that subcontractor with stronger fairness and higher levels of ability has incentive advantages.

Key words: public goods technological innovation；commissioned research and development；fairness；contract type, stochastic dependence

摘要： 企业参与是公共产品技术创新成功的重要支撑，合同设计不能只关注传统的影响因素，更要关注代理人的内在特征和外部环境；故构建基于公平偏好的双代理人模型，结合能力水平与外部共同冲击的影响探讨双方的公平偏好对公共部门合同设计与期望效用的影响。结果表明：公共部门期望效用与双方公平偏好强度差异正相关，但要满足两个先决条件：① 高能力的一方具备较强的公平偏好；② 公共部门必须依据公平偏好、随机依赖等对激励系数的大小与组合进行重新设计，且使公平偏好强度较强、能力水平较高的一方具有激励优势。

关键词: 公共产品技术创新, 委托研发, 公平偏好, 合同类型, 随机依赖