Abstract:

This paper develops a rational expectations model of executive compensation to analyze stock price manipulation. Combining the market characteristics, it also discusses the manipulation in the sci-tech innovation board of China’s securities market. The evidences show that promoting the completeness of law can help curb manipulation. Meanwhile, some characteristics may result in an increase of manipulation. The incentive elasticity, managers’ reputation preference, and market volatility may lead to an increase in the quantity and revenue of stock price manipulation.

Key words: completeness of law, new Securities Law, stock price manipulation, incentive elasticity

摘要：

通过构建一个附带法律机制的激励合约模型来讨论法律完备度、股权激励与股价操纵之间的关系。研究发现，新《证券法》的推行提高了法律完备度，抑制了一部分股价操纵。但是，从激励合约来看，股权激励弹性、经理人声誉偏好、市场波动性等特征可能会带来股价操纵的反向增加，新兴市场的股价操纵短期内可能会不降反升。而且，法律完备度的增加是缓慢的，依赖于法律执行力，而股权激励弹性、市场波动性等因素的影响却立竿见影。对激励弹性高的公司进行重点监管、建立经理人声誉指数将有助于提升股价操纵监管的效率。

关键词: 法律完备度, 新《证券法》, 股价操纵, 激励弹性